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The authors assembled in this collection agree that the effects of feminism on scientific and philosophical practices have been revolutionary, in the most positive sense of the word.  This success is described in terms of “collaboration,” “contribution,” and invariably in the rhetoric of rigor, reliability, solidity, a defensive rhetoric which reminds skeptics that, in spite of its overt politics, feminist analysis also consists of “good history, sharp critical thinking, good biology, and precise use of language.”​[3]​  In other words, skeptics need not worry that feminist contributions will in any way compromise the integrity and rigor with which scientists identify.  In addition, they need not object that the role of feminism in the sciences has been purely critical.  All of the essays in the volume argue for the “constructive” contributions of feminist theory, for the position that research and scholarship with a feminist edge have added something to the sciences in question, changing them by making them bigger (because more comprehensive) and better (because more accurate).  
Those disciplines which have had the biggest influx of women practitioners and feminist theorists have, accordingly, benefited most from analyses which fit Longino’s broad definition of feminist work as work “with a commitment ‘to prevent gender from being disappeared’.”​[4]​  These are most notably primatology, developmental biology, and archaeology, because these three sciences are, in the words of Scott Gilbert and Karen Rader, “in the business of telling us who we are and how we came to be.”​[5]​  They offer–or at least we fantasize that they do– histories, what are often called “natural histories,” narratives of a past which is assumed to be insulated from the contingencies of modern, human history.  And the latest literature defends the contributions of feminist science and feminist science studies by arguing that the work of feminists, work motivated by the commitment to prevent gender from being disappeared, has resulted in more accurate narratives of who we are and how we came to be, with more complete models, fewer gross errors, greater attention to detail, and more careful, reflexive, and responsible natural histories.








Of course, it is in the field of primatology that feminist theories have enjoyed the most public success, so much so that in the collection I am discussing, Linda Fedigan (following Donna Haraway) concludes that primate studies might be considered a branch of feminist theory.​[14]​  Here, too, feminist critique has yielded new research practices, by indicating how gender stereotypes influence sampling practices, directing everything from which species is considered most important to observe for what purposes, down to which individuals of that species it is appropriate to observe.  Elizabeth Lloyd’s essay, “Pre-Theoretical Assumptions in Evolutionary Explanations of Female Sexuality,” demonstrates how androcentrism has dictated which phenomena count as scientifically significant.   She describes the methodological problems created by the assumption that orgasm in female primates is connected to reproduction in the same way that it is in male primates, or, as she puts it, the assumption that “female sexuality doesn’t make sense unless it is in the service of reproduction.”  The result of this assumption is that researchers simply fail to study those orgasms which are not associated with intercourse or oestrus, because they won’t help us “make sense” of the evolution of orgasmic response in female primates.   Lloyd’s critique shows how a male-normative attitude in primatology limits research and distorts results.​[15]​  Fedigan considers this kind of critique to be less a specifically feminist contribution, and more a general contribution to the quality of the science: raising the standards of evidence.​[16]​  
As another example of methodological innovation from coming feminist work, Fedigan cites Haraway’s demand that scientists begin granting agency to female bodies as part of a larger movement in primatology to grant agency to animals, rather than treating them as “a passive resource.”​[17]​  New methodology, in turn, yields new “facts,” and Fedigan cites a body of literature where precisely this has happened: research influenced by feminist critiques has resulted in significant changes in our beliefs about primate social behaviors, and in new models of these societies, which tend to grant more agency to females and non-Alpha-males, rather than focusing on the social function of male aggression.  Feminist theory has acted as a further corrective by highlighting the degree of anthropomorphic projection present in primatological description.  The result, writes Fedigan, is that we are more acutely aware of the “dangers of... project[ing] Western gender role stereotypes onto animal patterns and onto our human ancestors.”​[18]​  This awareness requires an awareness of how gender stereotypes work in language, and once again, feminist analysis of language can save primatology from the considerable anthropomorphism from which it suffers, not just as a sexist science, but as a science.






Donna Haraway warned against this as far back as 1978.  In “Animal Sociology and the Body Politic, Part II: The Past is the Contested Zone,” she points out that “telling stories of the human past is a rule-governed activity,” and a great deal of research which calls itself feminist has done little to change the rules.  Instead, this research tells “of a different human nature, of different universals,” but fails to “leave the traditional space of science.”​[19]​  This failure is significant, given that scholars in feminist science studies often tell another story, which is in direct conflict with the narrative of consensus and collaboration I describe above.  
One of the most significant contributions of feminist science and feminist science studies was supposed to be an ethic of strong reflexivity, of critical attitude towards not only the object but also the subject of study, as an essential component of research.  Elizabeth Lloyd cites Longino’s redefinition of objectivity in science as “resulting from the critical interaction of different groups and individuals with different social and cultural assumptions and different stakes.  Under this view, the irreducibility of the social components of the scientific situation is accounted for–these social components are, in fact, an essential part of the picture of scientific practice.”​[20]​  However, the notion that an objective science must be reflexive, undogmatic, and critically accessible is hardly a feminist innovation–this idea was developed explicitly (and with a political agenda) in Karl Popper’s work, and is at the heart of his notion of falsifiablity as the primary criterion of scientific discourse.  The feminist innovation is the emphasis on dissensus, a term I borrow from and use in the spirit of Ewa Ziarek’s An Ethics of Dissensus: Postmodernity, Feminism, and the Politics of Radical Democracy (2001), as the alternative to epistemological models which rely fundamentally on consensus as the axis of critique.  Thus, the feminist innovation is the turn to dissensus between “different groups and individuals with different social and cultural assumptions and different stakes.”  For Popper, on the contrary, critique is limited to critiques between scientists, or at least critiques between people with more or less the same stakes (democracy, knowledge of the truth, freedom of thought, etc.).  If feminist scientists argue for the irreducibility of the differences between stakes, then they ought to embrace the idea that feminist and non-feminist scientists have different stakes and defend different interests.  Indeed, Lloyd says as much when she argues that one of the positive contributions of this feminist, reflexive stance is that if we can show science to be political, it will “lose at least some independent authority in the political arena.”​[21]​  Notice that we are no longer talking about epistemic reasons for supporting feminist research, but normative, political reasons.  Alison Wylie mentions at the very end of her essay that “the proponents of an archaeology of gender, especially the feminists among them, add to a growing range of voices that have been insisting that archaeologists must take responsibility for the normative (political, ethical) commitments, as well as the theoretical assumptions and methodological standards, that structure their practice.”​[22]​ 





Sandra Harding’s account of feminist standpoint theory (or “strong objectivity”), for example, results in conclusions which place her in the “universal history” camp.  In order to hear the voices of the marginalized, Harding writes, “strong objectivity requires that scientists and their communities be integrated into democracy-advancing projects for scientific and epistemological reasons, as well as moral and political ones.”​[24]​  It is this meta-narrative of democracy which worries me: if the only projects which count as socially and epistemically responsible are democracy-advancing projects, and we are all in agreement about what is meant by “democracy,” then in what sense are we still talking about groups and individuals with different cultural assumptions and different political stakes?  Harding states, without arguing for this point, that “democracy-advancing values” are not only politically desirable, but that they actually result in epistemically better sciences, having “systematically generated less partial and distorted beliefs than others.”​[25]​  Gilbert and Rader concur with this when they state that feminist critiques of research have resulted in a more scientifically congruent view of the world.  If your science is democratic, it seems, it is more likely to be epistemically successful.   From this perspective, of course, it makes no sense to think of feminist standpoint epistemologies as a threat to objectivity or good scientific practice.  We should remember, however, the dangers of arguing for the connection between a particular political stake and scientific accuracy–the most racist, sexist, heterosexist, and otherwise “undemocratic” research will yield a scientifically congruent view of the world in the context of particular racist, sexist, and heterosexist political stakes.  We should be suspicious of this rhetoric which takes political and epistemic success to be one and the same thing.
And so I am suspicious of this recent literature, which answers Harding’s call for democracy, consensus, and collaboration in the service of truth.  Even Helen Longino’s latest book, The Fate of Knowledge, de-emphasizes the differences between feminist and non-feminist stakes.  Chapter Eight, “Pluralism and Local Epistemologies,” argues for epistemic plurality versus unification, complexity versus simplicity, and local knowledge versus universal knowledge, using many real examples from contemporary biological research.​[26]​  Longino ends the chapter, however, by stating that we should consider the debates between competing interests and approaches as “critical interaction that advances all of them rather than as a duel requiring a single victor.”​[27]​   There is nothing objectively good, however, about advancing all interests.  Neither, I suggest, does advancing all interests have much to do with any robust, critical contemporary idea of democracy.  Why should I, for example, wish to advance the interests of a group which benefits from my political and economic disenfranchisement?  Are critiques of scientific practice not in existence because someone, somewhere, wants to promote some interests (say, the interests of some disenfranchised social group) and to substantially interrogate an existing authority (as in Lloyd’s hope that the awareness of the social nature of scientific knowledge might reduce the authority of science in the political arena)?
Indeed, instead of emphasizing the difference between the stakes of feminist science studies and liberation epistemologies like Popper’s, Longino takes the role of feminism in social studies of science to be part of the time-honored tradition of philosophers who “affirm the sociality of knowledge,” citing John Stuart Mill, Charles Sanders Pierce, and Karl Popper as examples of what she calls “predecessors” of her own project in this latest book.​[28]​  Linda Martín Alcoff makes a similar move at the opening of her essay, “On Judging Epistemic Credibility: Is Social Identity Relevant?”, where she places feminist philosophers in the canon of respectable philosophers like “Kant, Locke, Russell, and the Vienna Circle, who unashamedly declared and defended the political motivations of their work.”  Alcoff continues: “Feminist philosophy and feminist epistemology represent a continuation of the tradition in which philosophers openly avow their political aspirations.” ​[29]​  The motivation behind these formulations seems to be to defend feminist epistemologies from charges of bias and special interest, which means that Longino and Alcoff, along with Harding, continue, on some level, to buy into the authority of the disinterested, objective voice (even if they have offered us more complex and practically relevant definitions of objectivity than were ever available).  Why should feminist epistemologies wish to belong to any traditional political philosophy?  What do they gain from such a belonging, and at what price?  Or, to put it differently, if feminist theorists interrogate epistemology, should they not also interrogate the politics behind the tradition of politically motivated epistemologies?
The formulations of political motivation by Longino and Alcoff take us far away from the postmodern visions in Donna Haraway’s work, which leaves behind the “innocent” subject of modernity and the Enlightenment fantasy of his emancipation. On the contrary, the stakes adopted by contemporary, Anglo-American, feminist science studies are articulations of the most basic definition of the most retrograde of projects: modernity.  I am proposing that this rhetoric of predecessors and of the continuation of tradition is counter-productive, and that we ought to focus on those political motivations which have, precisely, no predecessors in the history of philosophy, on the ways in which feminist political stakes are, precisely “untraditional.”  Instead of linking onto concepts like political motivation, democracy, freedom, and even science, as they have been shaped historically and canonized, perhaps it is the task of feminist epistemologies to robustly interrogate these very concepts, their historical shaping, and their canonization.  Such interrogations, reflexivity on this level, make up the true political work of feminist thought.  Or, to put it differently, in order to prevent gender from being disappeared, feminist philosophy of science must return to its initial project of introducing far more than the dimension of gender to scientific discourse.  Not only will the history of modern philosophy from Kant to the Vienna Circle not provide the critical paradigms which feminism needs to affect the necessary transformations, it is modernity itself which is incommensurable with (we could even say: stands in the way of) a radical transformation of the culture of science.

Towards an Epistemology of Dissensus





From the perspective of Lyotard’s account of the postmodern, of course, the very possibility of this way of understanding humanity is in crisis: “the real question is whether or not there is a human history.”​[34]​  The fantasy of humanity as the hero of liberty ultimately suffers from a crisis of legitimation.  Since such a free, inclusive science depends on the idea of a fully autonomous agent involved in ethical and political decisions, the narrative of emancipation effects a division of reason into science, or cognitive or theoretical reason, on the one hand, and ethics/politics, or practical reason, on the other.  This division ultimately delegitimizes the genre of discourse called science, “indirectly, by revealing that it is a language game with its own rules, . . ., and that it has no special calling to supervise the game of praxis.”  The delegitimation of the modern notion of science opens the road “for an important current of postmodernity: science plays its own game; it is incapable of legitimating other language games.”​[35]​  According to Lyotard, it is in this delegitimized state that contemporary knowledge finds itself.
 In the wake of the failures of the great modern narratives, the possibility of a universal history with emancipation as its end, and the possibility of a “we” which is the subject of that history are both fully delegitimized.  The postmodern condition is “the contingency of what follows” from this crisis of legitimation.  
There are several possible ways to follow on, and we [the “we” whose very identity is in question as it faces this crisis] have to decide between them.  Even if we decide nothing, we still decide.  Even if we remain silent, we speak.  Politics depends entirely upon how we follow on from one sentence to the next.  This is not a matter of the volume of the discourse, nor of the importance of the speaker or the addressee.  One of the sentences which are currently possible will become real, and the question is: which?  A description of [the crisis] does not give us even the beginnings of an answer to that question.  This is why the word postmodernity can refer simultaneously to the most disparate prospects.​[36]​  
Donna Haraway’s work from the late seventies signals this condition of crisis, and calls for feminist science studies to exploit precisely this disparity, to realize the potential for real contest on the level of meta-narrative.  In contrast to the “consensual critique”-model of science as democratically-oriented, critical interaction which benefits everyone, Haraway proposes a “dissensual critique”-model, starting from the assumption that contest and polemic are irreducible and epistemically valuable, and indicating the need for what Lyotard describes as the real feminist contribution, the “guerilla war of skirmishes and raids in a space and time other that those imposed for millenia by the masculine logos.”  She highlights the same meta-level instability which Lyotard describes: 
Feminists must not expect even arguments that answer clear sexist bias within the sciences to produce adequate final theories of production and reproduction as well.  Such theories still elude us, because we are now engaged in a political-scientific struggle to formulate the rules through which we will articulate them.  The terrain of primatology is the contested zone.  The future is the issue.​[37]​  
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